I. To the Question

208. Here two things must be looked at: first what is being supposed, second what question is being asked.

A. The Supposition being Made

209. For it is supposed that Christ’s body exists in a double way, namely in heaven in a natural way and in the Eucharist in a sacramental way.

Each point is sufficiently manifest. The first from Augustine [On John’s Gospel tr.30 n.1], and it is in Gratian Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.44, “Until the end of the age, the Lord is above.” The second is manifest from what was said in question 1 earlier [nn.15-23].

210. But a doubt about the body as it is in the Eucharist concerns what the things are that it contains as parts.

211. I say that it does not contain the soul nor the accidents.

This is possible if one takes body for the thing that the soul first perfects, because there is no contradiction in this sort of body being without soul and without accidents.

212. It is also fitting, because the species represent food, and so substance and not accidents.

213. It also did in fact happen, because if the Eucharist had been consecrated during the Triduum, the true thing of the sacrament would have been there, and yet the soul would not have been there, as will be said at the end of this solution [nn.254-255, 258].

214. Also, the body does not in this way contain the blood, because this is possible and is true in fact, for blood is not animate and consequently not part of the primarily animated thing.

215. It is possible too on the part of the sacrament or in the sacrament, because in the case of different things there can be the same freely chosen sign or a different sign. The body, as taken in the stated way, differs essentially from the soul and secondarily from other things (as the blood and the like); therefore it can have a different sign. And this is proved a minori, because the body can have a natural sign that is not the same [as the sign of the blood]. For there are two essentially distinct concepts for body and blood, which concepts are the signs of conceived things, On Interpretation 2.16a19-20. And blood is essentially different from the body as the body is the thing primarily perfected by the soul. Therefore there can be a sign of it, namely of the body, that is not the same as the sign of the blood.

216. This is also proved as a fact, because it was possible for all the blood to have been separated from the body of Christ in death, and yet if the Eucharist had then been consecrated, there would have been the same thing as now. It is also possible that a large amount of the blood flowed out, and yet the whole same thing would have remained under the species of bread.

217. One must therefore hold here that the body of Christ, as it is primarily signified and contained in the species of bread, does not include the soul nor the accidents nor the blood.

B. The Question being Asked

218. As to the question asked, one must first consider the sense of the question.

219. The question here is not about the necessity of the existence of one extreme or the other, nor about the necessity of having parts or properties absolutely. But the question is about the necessity of concomitance or consequence, namely whether there are parts or properties in the body of Christ, or whether they are necessarily concomitant or consequent to it, as it exists in the way stated - on the grounds that the same things are present in the body existing in the same way.

220. And this can be understood in two ways: first whether by the ‘necessarily’ is meant necessity absolute and simply, or necessity only in a certain respect - namely that the consequent necessarily follows simply from the positing of the antecedent, or that it follows in a certain respect or by supposition, that is, on the supposition of the existence of the subject of the consequent.

221. First then one must consider necessity simply and secondly necessity in a certain respect.

1. Whether the Natural Parts and Properties of Christ’s Body are Simply Necessarily in the Eucharist as well

a. First Conclusion

222. About the first I say (and let it be the first conclusion) that there is no necessity simply that, if Christ’s body has parts or properties, it have the same ones in sacramental mode.

This is clear in brief because after the [general] resurrection there will be no Eucharist, nor either will Christ’s body have properties or features in that way, and yet it will then have them in its natural way of being.

b. Second Conclusion

223. The second conclusion is that there is no necessity simply the other way, namely that it does not follow simply necessarily that, if the body of Christ has these parts and properties in a sacramental way, it have them for this reason in natural existence.

224. This is plain first as follows: when some existence is indifferent as to two modes, then just as it can be had simply in one mode, so can it also be had simply in the other mode; but the existence simply of Christ’s body (or the thing of Christ’s body simply and really) is indifferent to these two modes, namely natural and sacramental; therefore it can be had in the latter way just as in the former, or even though not in the former.

225. Some say [Aquinas] to this, that the sense of the first premise is when neither mode depends on the other; but it is not so here, because the sacramental mode depends on the natural mode, because the natural mode is the first way the thing in the sacrament exists.

226. On the contrary, and to the main conclusion: existence in the natural mode is not of the essence of existence in the sacramental mode, nor is it the cause of it; therefore the latter does not depend on the former, because nothing depends on something which is not of its essence or cause of it, as it seems.

The first part of the antecedent is plain, because the thing of the Eucharist does not have there its natural mode of being, namely extension; but it would have it if this were of the essence of the existence or mode of being that it has there; for everything that has something has what is of the essence of it.

The proof of the second part of the antecedent is that God is the immediate cause of this existence, name of Christ’s body in the sacrament; therefore the body in its natural existence is not cause of sacramental existence.

227. Again (and it is the same as the prior argument [n.224]), the Eucharist does not depend on that which is neither the sacrament nor the thing of the sacrament, or that is not cause of one or the other; existence in the natural mode is not the sacrament (as is plain), nor is it the thing of the sacrament; rather the thing of the sacrament is existence in another, disparate mode; nor is existence in the natural mode cause of one or the other, as is plain from what has been said [n.226].

228. Again (and this is almost the same), God can cause a thing without any created thing not intrinsic to that thing; existence in the natural mode is not intrinsic to the Eucharist;     therefore etc     .

229. You will say that the major is true of absolute things but not of a relation, because a relation cannot come to be without its foundation and term; but the Eucharist includes a relation, whose term is the existence of the body.

230. On the contrary: although existence is the same in both modes, namely sacramental and natural, yet it is not the term of the relation that is included in the Eucharist in its natural mode but in a disparate mode. Proof: the thing is contained in the Eucharist in the same way that it is the primary signified thing of this sign; for this is the difference between this sacrament and others, that it really contains the first thing it signifies; but existence in the natural mode is not contained here really, but rather in another disparate mode;     therefore etc     .

c. Two Corollaries that Flow from the Second Conclusion

231. From this second conclusion follows a corollary, that before the Incarnation there could have been a Eucharist as true as there is now, and this both as to signification and as to the thing signified and contained.

232. A second corollary is that, after the Incarnation, Christ’s body could have ceased to exist in its natural mode, and yet a true Eucharist would remain both as to the truth of the sign and as to the truth of the thing signified and contained. The consequence is plain, that if from ‘the body of Christ is really contained in the Eucharist’ does not necessarily follow ‘the same body has existence in its natural mode’, then the first could be done without the second, whether it precedes or remains after the destruction of the second.

233. A proof specifically about the first as preceding the second [n.232] is this: wherever a temporal thing can have one real existence, it can simply begin to be there really after it was not. But the body of Christ can simply begin to have one real existence in the sacramental mode of existence; therefore it can simply begin to be in this mode of being, namely in the sacramental mode, after it was not here. Therefore, in order for it to begin simply to be, it is not necessary that it begin to be also in the other mode of being.

234. And if you say that when it begins here it must begin elsewhere at the same time, because, if there is a beginning simply, there is a being of the thing in itself simply; for if it begins to be in another at the same time, then, for there to be a beginning simply, it is no less necessary that it begin to be in itself, because the beginning simply of a thing is the same, just as its being simply is the same; but the being simply of this thing in itself is the being of it in its natural mode. - This response is excluded by the reasons given for the second conclusion [nn.224, 227], because if it [Christ’s body] has real existence in this way as much as in the other (from the first reason), and the latter does not depend on the other (from the second reason), then it follows that it can have a beginning simply in this sacramental mode without having a beginning in the other [natural] mode.

235. One can argue in the same way for the corollary about ‘ceasing to be’ [n.232], because wherever a temporal thing has true existence, then, as long as it remains there, it would not altogether cease to be when it ceased to be in the other mode.

d. Difficulties against the Two Corollaries and their Solution

236. Against the first corollary [n.231] I infer this unacceptable result: therefore the body could begin to be after it was, for the body began to be in the Incarnation, and yet it would have truly been before, if there had been a true Eucharist [before].

237. Against the second corollary [n.232], because then the same body would cease to be after it had ceased to be. Proof: because by ceasing to be in its natural mode it would cease to be, and yet it would remain if a true Eucharist afterwards remained.

238. I say that neither consequence is valid, because what has being simply does not, if it begins to be in another mode, begin to be save in a certain respect. Similarly, what remains in being simply would not, if it ceased to be elsewhere in another mode, cease to be save in a certain respect.

239. As to the argument about the Incarnation [n.236] I say that it would have been possible for that body to have been formed of the blood of the Virgin, and this in its natural mode of existing, notwithstanding the fact that a true Eucharist had preceded. But this formation would not have been the beginning of Christ’s body save in a certain respect, just as now the conversion of the bread into the body is not a beginning of the body save in a certain respect; and the whole reason is that what begins thus to be has being simply beforehand.

240. I speak similarly about the second argument [n.237], that the ceasing to be of the body in the natural mode would not be a ceasing to be save in a certain respect, provided however that the same body remained having the same real existence in the sacramental mode.

241. And if you object that “as it is, there was a beginning simply of Christ’s body in the Incarnation, so there would likewise have thus been a beginning simply if the Eucharist had preceded, for the being of Christ’s body in its natural mode would have been no less true then than now, and consequently, when it acquired that being, his body would, in receiving that sort of being, have had no less true a beginning” - I reply that beginning simply requires not only a beginning to true being and to being simply of that which is said to begin, but also a beginning to the first being of it. But, as it is, there was in the Incarnation a receiving not only of being but also of first being. Then, however, [sc. if the Eucharist had preceded the Incarnation] there would have been a beginning of being simply in one mode, but not the first mode, because the same being simply would have preceded under a different mode [sc. the sacramental mode], and then there would have been a beginning in a certain respect, but now a beginning simply.

242. But if you argue about ceasing to be, that ceasing to be in the natural mode is ceasing to be simply, for corruption in that sense is corruption simply and a corruption everywhere, since if it is not corrupted here then it remains after it was corrupted - I reply that no contradictories are to be admitted about the same thing when there is a distinction in their modes of being (as will be stated immediately). If therefore you are speaking of the corruption that is the separation of part from part (as of the body from the soul, or of the form of corporeity from the matter), then if there is such a corruption of something existing in such a mode, there is also a corruption of it in any mode. Otherwise the same form would inform and not inform the same thing at the same time, and consequently Christ’s body could not be made to be without a soul in the natural mode without it also being made to be without a soul in the sacrament, and vice versa. Nor too could Christ’s body be resolved into matter (the form of corporeity having been here separated from it) without being resolved there, and vice versa.

243. But if we are speaking of a corruption or separation, namely about the total ceasing to be of what is contained in this mode and in the other, Christ’s body could well cease to be here without ceasing to be there, and vice versa, because the whole ceases to have one mode of its existence while retaining the other mode, under each of which modes its total existence is truly preserved.

e. Third Corollary

244. From the above follows a corollary, namely that by the corruption that nature could bring about in the body of Christ, that is, by separation of part from part, it would be necessary for the separation of the parts of this thing to be made in the same way here and there. But through the destruction that God could bring about by his absolute power (a destruction not indeed of the being simply of the thing but of the thing in this mode), the thing would be able not to have that mode of being and yet able to have the other.

245. And if it is objected against this that what is nothing in itself is nothing in something else; therefore if Christ’s body did not have existence, that is, in the natural mode, it could not have existence in the sacrament - I say that if the major is understood by prescinding from every mode of being in something, it is false, for the body of Christ equally truly has its own real being when existing in another and when existing in itself. But if the major is understood in itself, without prescinding but by positing the proper real existence of this body, I concede it. And then I say that if the body is only in the Eucharist, it is not however not in itself, because it truly has being in that way in itself and in the Eucharist, where it exists under the sign [sc. of the Eucharist], just as it does in heaven, where it does not exist in a sign.

2. Whether the Same Parts and Properties are Present by Necessity in a Certain Respect

246. About the second member of the distinction, namely about necessity taken in a certain respect, that is, about the existence of the subject of the consequent [nn.220-221], the conclusion is this, that it is thus necessary for the same properties and parts to be in the body of Christ in this mode of being and in that.

247. Proof: because no absolute thing ceases to be in anything when a new respect comes to it precisely from outside; the properties and parts in the body are truly absolutes; but their presence in the Eucharist is only an extrinsic respect coming to them;     therefore etc     .

248. This can be argued also in accord with what was said in question two of this distinction [nn.30-41, 129-131,], that an absolute thing does not vary because of a variation in relations of ‘where’ and the like; therefore, nothing absolute in a body varies because of its ‘where’ in heaven and because of the presence of it in the Eucharist that is assimilated to a relation ‘where’.

249. Proof of the major of the first reason [n.247]:

Because there is no formal repugnance in such relation to a preexisting ‘where’, nor even is there a virtual repugnance, in the way that a contrary property is repugnant to a subject (as cold is repugnant to fire); because the opposite of this relation [sc. ‘where’] does not arise from the principles of the absolute thing, for then this relation would not be inherent in it contingently nor would it come to it from outside.

Secondly as follows: an absolute is naturally first present in what it is present in before a relation is present that is founded on that absolute, and especially a relation that is extrinsic and comes to the thing contingently. Therefore in that prior moment, before the body is understood to have a new relation in the Eucharist, either its quantity and everything else absolute is present in it, and I have the conclusion proposed, or these are not present and it follows that the contradictories are simply true,That is, the contradictories of asserting and denying of the same subject (Christ’s body) the same quantity and properties. For these properties, being absolute, would belong or not belong to Christ’s body regardless of differences in the extrinsic relation of ‘where’. ¹⁴ for affirmation and negation cannot be said to hold according to diverse features (namely according to this and that ‘where’, or to this or that presence), because just as affirmation is not of a nature to hold because of ‘where’, so neither is negation.

250. This could also be plainly argued as follows: contradictories are not simply true of the same thing in the same respect; nor should one add to ‘the same’ the addition of ‘when the predicate is absolute; a body, if it does not have the absolute here and does have it there, is here the same and at the same time and in the same respect’.

251. The two first conditions are plain [sc. ‘same thing’ and ‘in the same respect’].

252. Proof of the third [one should not add ‘when the predicate is absolute...’], because nothing else is here and there save ‘where’ and ‘where’; but neither absolute affirmation nor absolute negation hold according to ‘where’. This is plain in what is posited here, because a body can well be moved in place here and there, not insofar as these are in it according to different ‘wheres’. And so there is a fallacy of the consequent in arguing thus: ‘it is not moved here, therefore it is not moved’, although it may commonly hold due to the matter [sc. because bodies are commonly in one place; but Christ’s body can be in more than one place]. And likewise, if the same thing had two surfaces, it could well be white according to one and black according to the other; nor would there be contrariety or contradiction, because they would not hold of it according to the same sense. But as to absolute affirmation and the negation of it (provided they do not amount to the same, and provided there is no difference there save that of relations), it is manifest that they will hold according to the same sense, because the relations could not be the reason for which the affirmation and negation would hold [sc. true together], because this reason is naturally posterior to what is absolute.